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Privacy Reform and the Heuristics of Privacy Utility | |
< < | -- By AnthonyMahmud - 07 Dec 2019 | > > | While education may be the long term solution for sparking privacy reform, the pace at which people are forfeiting their personal data online suggests that more immediate action is necessary. In a climate where a desire for privacy is often construed as an implication of guilt, mending the public opinion towards privacy involves understanding how people actually perceive utility from privacy in the first place. Though the inherent value of privacy is rooted in its ties with safety, individuality and autonomy, human engagement with it might also be attributable to other, exogenous factors. | | | |
< < | As discussed in class, protecting privacy and autonomy requires more than enacting data privacy legislation. Lasting change only becomes possible when society’s attitude towards such liberties shifts from merely desiring general safety to demanding privacy protections as an inalienable right. While education may be the long term solution for sparking such a change, the pace at which people are forfeiting their personal data online suggests that more immediate action is necessary. In a climate where a desire for privacy is often construed as an implication of guilt, mending the public opinion towards privacy involves understanding how people actually perceive utility from privacy in the first place. Though the inherent value of privacy is rooted in its ties with safety, individuality and autonomy, human satisfaction and engagement with it might also be attributable to other, exogenous factors. | > > | Humankind’s relationship with wealth may reflect some of these factors. Dusenberry’s influential “relative income theory” (RIT) suggested that spending habits are not just a product of one’s absolute income, but also the position of their income relative to external benchmarks to which one compares oneself. Subsequent studies corroborated the theory that status-relative externalities are influential. Kahneman and Tversky’s “Prospect Theory” posited that one’s economic behavior involves a comparison between their own financial position and “neutral reference points”—aggregated societal norms such as median income. In 1996, Clark and Oswald recognized that these subjective exercises affect not only qualitative economic behavior but also one’s general sense of emotion and wellbeing. | | | |
> > | Should engagement with privacy share the externally contingent attributes of its satisfaction with income, a viable alternative avenue for shaping public attitude on privacy may exist. A plausible short-term strategy could be to paint privacy hygiene as a status symbol—an asset with which one must “keep up with the Jones’.” Perhaps the same envious social fabric that prompts people to flaunt every life detail on Facebook can spark the motivation to combat exploitative technology. | | | |
> > | Such a conclusion rests on a tenuous link and faces uncertain parameters of actionability: how do we know if our privacy behavior is influenced similarly to our economic behavior? Even if parallels exist, how do those qualities manifest in the context of privacy? How does one go about “comparing” privacy, how would one measure privacy, and against what is one comparing? While no absolute answers are apparent, promising guidance exists. | | | |
< < | The Relative Perception of Wealth | > > | Recent developments in RIT identify comparative mechanisms that seem compatible with a social scheme of comparing privacy. A 2010 study suggested that perceived income satisfaction is causally related to intragroup income comparison. It found that where one’s income ranked relative to peers of similar locale, gender, and age best explained the variance in life satisfaction. While this finding doesn’t exhaustively define one’s “in-group,” the structure that it does test (age, location, etc.) translates to a framework that makes sense in the context of privacy. One’s perception of their privacy practices would be directly “ranked” against those with whom they interact: neighbors, colleagues, family and friends. The question of measurement remains tricky, but as societal tech literacy progresses, it’s plausible that lay people will recognize and compare the actions they take to protect their digital privacy. | | | |
< < | Such an askew relationship would seem consistent with humankind’s nature as economically irrational decision makers. Our relationship with wealth embodies this characteristic. J.S. Dusenberry’s influential “relative income theory,” a departure from Keynes’ normative model of consumption, suggested that spending habits are not just a product of one’s absolute income, but also the position of their income relative to external benchmarks to which one compares oneself. Subsequent derivations of Duesenberry’s work identified other behavioral responses in which and constructs through which status-relative externalities are influential. Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 “Prospect Theory” posited that one’s economic behavior involves a comparison between their own financial position and “neutral reference points”—aggregated societal norms such as median income. In 1996, Clark and Oswald recognized that these subjective exercises affect not only qualitative economic behavior but also one’s self-perceived satisfaction with their income and even general sense of emotion and wellbeing. | > > | The boundaries within which these comparisons would be made seem to line up with those in which income predicts satisfaction. Thus, the remaining question is whether these similar factors warp our privacy behaviors the same way that they do our economic behavior. | | | |
< < | Why it Matters for Advocacy | > > | Obtaining empirical evidence in either direction is implausible, but qualitative comparison offers some circumstantial evidence of value. In particular, the “hicksploitation” phenomenon and “anti-vaxx” movement provide channels of guidance. “Hicksploitation” refers to a burgeoning array of media that portrays disproportionately negative qualities of working class and rural Americans. Notable examples include “Duck Dynasty” and “Here Comes Honey-Boo-Boo.” While not explicitly derogatory, these programs highlight stereotypical “redneck” aspects of people’s lives, and their wide success across demographics suggests that they appeal to audiences that aren’t engaged because they find the content relatable or informative. The memes and derivative remarks made about the shows online suggest that a significant draw for the genre is to induce laughter at the expense of the cast members. Many viewers seemed to find satisfaction and pride in their own, subjectively “superior” status when watching the plights of perceived inferiors. | | | |
< < | Should humankind’s engagement and satisfaction with privacy share the externally contingent attributes of its satisfaction with income, a viable alternative avenue for shaping public attitude on privacy may exist. The direct, “Keynesian” argument for fundamental privacy reform is challenging given society’s dependence on data-mining technology and “somebody else but not me” risk assessment of its harms. More plausible in the short run might be to paint privacy hygiene as a status symbol—an asset with which one must “keep up with the Jones’.” (Keeping up with the Snowdens?) Perhaps the same envious social fabric that prompts people to flaunt every detail of their lives on Facebook can spark the motivation to combat exploitative technology. | > > | Much like “hicksploitation” figures, “anti-vaxx” advocates are enthusiastically lampooned for their perceived incompetence. Even if the public health danger posed by anti-vaxx groups warrants much of the hostility they receive, it does not fully account for the volume of attention they attract. Few of the millions of social media anti-vaxx discussions contain substantive argument or advocacy proposals. Most comments don’t even communicate anger or disgust. Rather, the majority of anti-vaxx discussion on the internet involves demeaning and caricaturing its advocates advocates for comedic purposes. | | | |
< < | But Does it Apply to Privacy? | > > | In relation to privacy, these examples illustrate how hierarchical, comparative perceptions of intelligence, class, and culture influence one’s own engagement and subjective satisfaction. Even if privacy engagement isn’t as polarizing as these phenomena, both provoke the socializations into which we are indoctrinated and can induce our prejudices towards tokens of social capital. | | | |
< < | Such a conclusion rests on a tenuous link and faces uncertain parameters of actionability. For one, how do we know if the way we derive utility from privacy comports with the heuristics that bend our relationship with wealth? Secondly, even if the parallel exists, do how “externally contingent attributes” manifest in the context of privacy: how does one go about “comparing” privacy, against what is one comparing, and how would people, (many of whom do not know the face or implications of digital privacy,) go about measuring it? While no absolute answers are available, there may be reason to believe they nonetheless exist.
Does the Framework Make Sense Within the Context of Privacy?
First addressing the second inquiry, more recent developments in relative income theory identify comparative mechanisms that seem compatible with a social scheme of comparing privacy. A 2010 study suggested that perceived income satisfaction is causally related to intragroup income comparison, rather than the “neutral reference points” comparison advanced by Tversky. Controlling for country-wide aggregated economic status, the study found that where one’s income ranked relative to peers of similar locale, gender, and age independently explained the variance in life satisfaction far better than absolute income or neutral referential comparison. While this finding may not have exhaustively narrowed the parameters which define one’s “in-group,” the structure that it does test (age, location, etc.) translates to a framework that seems reasonable and makes sense in the context of privacy. People wouldn’t be comparing themselves to some abstract, “aggregated median” reference level of privacy hygiene. One’s perception of their privacy practices would be directly “ranked” against those with whom they interact. These points of comparison are going to be neighbors, colleagues, family and friends: the people, (however much isolated,) with whom they’re likely to interact on Facebook and in day to day affairs. The question of measurement remains tricky, but as societal tech literacy progresses, it does not seem unfathomable that people will recognize and casually discuss the measures they take to protect their privacy on the internet. While maybe more of an art than a science, lay people can conceivably differentiate between peers who tape their webcams, use a more secure browser, or install tools that block advertisements and scripts.
People are going to have conversations on the matter and comparisons are inevitable. The boundaries within which and people against whom these comparisons are made seem to line up with those in which income predicts satisfaction. Thus, the remaining question, now addressing the first inquiry, is whether these similar factors warp our privacy behaviors and satisfaction the way that they do our economic behavior and subjective well being.
Does the Framework Influence Privacy the Same Way?
Realistically, obtaining concrete evidence in either direction is unlikely. Perhaps the best empirical evidence one could gather is a multiple regression of privacy satisfaction on some weighted calculation of qualitative practices (do they use a VPN, are they using a wired connection, whatever it may be.) Ultimately, both the independent and dependent variables would be poor proxies for the abstract values they represent. Even if privacy engagement could be perfectly “crunched” into a quantitative value, (which may be less farfetched than it sounds given how much companies and governments already discern from people’s data,) the predictor variables would so numerous and inter-tangled that multicollinearity flaws would loom large.
Even though we can’t map the privacy relationship with the empirical integrity we can the wealth relationship, (itself not immune to ample validity criticism,) qualitative comparison offers some circumstantial evidence of value. In particular, the “hicksploitation” phenomenon and “anti-vaxx” movement provide channels of guidance. “Hicksploitation” was coined in the early 2010s and referred to a burgeoning array of media that portrayed disproportionately negative qualities of working class and rural Americans. Notable examples include the reality TV shows Duck Dynasty and Here Comes Honey Boo Boo. While not explicitly derogatory, the programs highlight the stereotypically “redneck” aspects of people’s lives, and their booming success across demographics suggests that they appeal to audiences that aren’t engaged because they find the content relatable or merely informative. The memes and derivative remarks made about the shows on social media further evidence that a significant draw for the genre is to induce laughter at the expense of the cast members. Many viewers seemed to find satisfaction and pride in their own, subjectively “superior” socioeconomic status when watching the dramatized plights and shortcomings of perceived inferiors.
Public reaction to the anti-vaxx movement has garnered comparable sentiment. While being of working class and backing a scientifically unfounded movement are starkly dissimilar, individuals in both groups are enthusiastically lampooned for their perceived incompetence. Even if the public health danger posed by anti-vaxx groups warrants much of the hostility they receive, it does not fully account for their volume of attention. Like “hicksploitation” shows, engagement with anti-vaxx discourse is hardly limited to those expressing genuine support or objection. Among the flood of clickbait articles and forum threads where anti-vaxx stories are discussed, few of the millions of comments contain substantive argument or advocacy proposals (there’s little material to debate in the first place.) A surprisingly large proportion of comments don’t even communicate anger or disgust. Rather, the a substantial amount of anti-vaxx discussion on the internet revolves demeaning and caricaturing anti-vaxx advocates (typically likening them to the same “Hicksploitation” working-class stereotypes.)
In relation to privacy, these examples illustrate how hierarchical, comparative perceptions of intelligence, class, and culture influence one’s own engagement and subjective satisfaction. Even if privacy engagement isn’t as polarizing as anti-vaxxers or Honey Boo Boo, both provoke the socializations into which we are indoctrinated and can induce our prejudices towards tokens of social capital. After all, privacy over what we read is amounting to one of the 21st century’s greatest luxuries.*
Potential Implications
Though speculative and qualitatively justified, the potential relationship between privacy engagement and comparative social perceptions provides an optimistic outlet for shaping public opinion. The relative income hypothesis developments suggest that touting safety or warning of harm may not be the only tools for selling people on privacy. A second finding in the 2010 study suggests that one’s comparative analysis skews upwards: “people compare to those above themselves in income 1.75 times more than they do those below.” For advocacy, this could mean that ingroup leaders of privacy reform are more influential than they may think. This idea taken with the rank-relative (rather than reference point relative) income theory suggests that a single voice can influence a group regardless of that group’s level of privacy engagement relative to society at large. The anecdotes from the anti-vaxx and “hicksploitation” examples reveal that “downward” facing advocacy efforts can be effective as well. This doesn’t require vilification of the unengaged or making jest of their vulnerability. Rather, it should compel us to share stories when we hear about or experience exploitation. Acknowledging the frightening realities faced by those less prepared can reinforce one’s appreciation for the steps they have already taken. Whether by stick or carrot, the social circles in which we operate profoundly influence our attitudes towards important issues. Small forum privacy advocacy is powerful, and one doesn’t need to be particularly proficient themself to carry gravity within their sphere of influence. Broad education may be the long term solution, but in the meantime, small acts can have meaningful, immediate effect.
This draft is more than 1600 words. No draft over 1000 words can pass.
So you need to cut this by 38%. The best way is to reconsider the proportions of the argument. Your underlying question is how to advertise privacy. Even if behavioral economics is the way to invent social strategies, the whole argument depends on the comparison between relative income theory and "how people think about privacy." That's too weak a link to make this more than a peripheral point. Suddenly all those words aren't required anymore. But an idea about how to advertise privacy is.
| > > | The potential relationship between privacy engagement and comparative social perceptions provides an optimistic outlet for shaping public opinion. RIT developments suggest that touting safety or warning of harm may not be the only tools for selling people on privacy. A second finding in the 2010 study suggests that one’s comparative analysis skews upwards: “people compare to those above themselves in income 1.75 times more than those below.” For privacy advocacy, this could mean that ingroup leaders are more influential than they may think. This idea taken with the rank-RIT suggests that a single voice can influence a group regardless of that group’s current level of privacy engagement. The anecdotes from the anti-vaxx and “hicksploitation” examples reveal that “downward” facing advocacy efforts can also be effective. This doesn’t require vilification of the unengaged, but it should compel us to share stories when we hear about or experience exploitation. The social circles in which we operate profoundly influence our attitudes towards important issues, and one doesn’t need to be particularly proficient in privacy to carry gravity within their sphere of influence. Broad education may be the long-term solution, but in the meantime, small acts can have meaningful, immediate effect. | |
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