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Introduction | |
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< | Most Americans drive. The United States is home to over 250 million vehicles, each with a unique license plate. Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) track drivers--taking a picture of every car that passes and collecting data on the time and location of each scan [1]. This data can be used by police to track the movement of criminals [2]. Positioned on top of light poles, on top of police cars, and on traffic lights, ALPRs cross check, license plates against "hot lists" of plates that have been uploaded to the system and provide alerts to law enforcement when a match appears [3]. However, ALPRs do not just track and store the data of license plates that generate hits, they store the data of every vehicle that passes them. For every one million plates read in Maryland, only 0.2% resulted in a hit, and just 47 were potentially associated with serious crimes [4]. Databases of this information can be used to essentially create a record of the travel history of millions of drivers, regardless of their criminal history. | >
> | Most Americans drive. The United States is home to over 250 million vehicles, each with a unique license plate. Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) track drivers--taking a picture of every car that passes and collecting data on the time and location of each scan [1]. This data can be used by police to track the movement of criminals [2]. Positioned on top of light poles, on top of police cars, and on traffic lights, ALPRs cross check, license plates against "hot lists" of plates that have been uploaded to the system and provide alerts to law enforcement when a match appears [3]. | | | | |
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< | Regulations and Privacy Concerns
Law enforcement is not the only faction taking advantage of ALPRs, HOAs, apartment complexes, and other private companies retain the license plates and can even sell the information to police departments [5]. Legal policies fail to curb the collection and use of this data. As of 2022, only 16 states have legislation expressly addressing the use of ALPRs or the retention of data collected by ALPRs and these policies vary widely [6]. In New Hampshire, data must be deleted within three minutes, in Maine, 21 days, and in other states, there is no limit [7]. | >
> | Privacy Concerns
ALPRs do not just track and store the data of license plates that generate hits, they store the data of every vehicle that passes them. For every one million plates read in Maryland, only 0.2% resulted in a hit, and just 47 were potentially associated with serious crimes [4]. Law enforcement is not the only faction taking advantage of ALPRs, HOAs, apartment complexes, and other private companies retain the license plates and can even sell the information to police departments [5]. | | | | |
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< | The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, but with modern technology, the scope of "searches" and "seizures" has expanded beyond physical definitions. Katz v. US held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the government from intruding upon a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” (Katz). However, due to the “pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways,” there is no expectation of privacy in the content of license plates (New York v. Class). The question remains, at what point does the tracking of vehicles become unreasonable? | >
> | Databases of this information can be used to essentially create a record of the travel history of millions of drivers, regardless of their criminal history. Yes, the data that ALPRs collect on license plates is publicly available, but the history of who traveled where and when is not. | | | | |
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< | In US v. Jones the Supreme Court held that warrants were required to install a GPS tracking device on a car for extended surveillance. Police must also get warrants before obtaining location information based on mobile phones from cell phone providers because of “the depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” of this data combined with “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection” by simply carrying a cell phone (Carpenter v. US). The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether police access to historical ALPR data requires a warrant. | >
> | Regulations fail to curb the collection and use of this data. As of 2022, only 16 states have legislation expressly addressing the use of ALPRs or the retention of data collected by ALPRs and these policies vary widely [6]. In New Hampshire, data must be deleted within three minutes, in Maine, 21 days, and in other states, there is no limit [7]. | | | | |
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> | The Courts also offer no protection. Police must have warrants to obtain location information based on mobile phones from cell phone providers because of “the depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” of this data combined with “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection” by simply carrying a cell phone (Carpenter v. US). As of now, the same does not apply to data collected by ALPRs.
Why We Should Care
People should be as concerned with ALPRs collecting logs of where they drive as much as they are concerned with the logs of locations on cell phones. The omnipotent presence of ALPRs makes them essentially unavoidable. This also means that databases of ALPR logs provide their owners access to detailed accounts of people’s whereabouts. Government and private parties can use this data to find out who knows whom, which car was used in the sales of certain goods, or where someone is likely to be at a certain time. License plate numbers are public data, but the collection and retention of data on license plate whereabouts places an immense amount of power in the hands of ALPR owners. | | | Looking Forward | |
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< | The use of ALPRs to monitor and track citizens must be regulated. Because private companies and well as the government have access to this information, the data collected has already become commodified. The databases created by these contain an unfathomable amount of information on our movement, and in the hands of private actors can lead to discrimination and manipulation. Data retention policies must be implemented on a nation-wide level, requiring deletion within days or weeks. Use of ALPRs should be strictly limited to law enforcement agencies operating with warrants to assist in ongoing criminal investigations. This data should not be permitted to be sold or monetized. | >
> | The use of ALPRs to monitor and track citizens must be regulated. On the government side, access to ALPR databases should be strictly limited to law enforcement agencies operating with warrants to assist in ongoing criminal investigations. Funding and other forms of federal assistance can be conditioned on particular privacy regimes for the information collected by government ALPRs.
Private companies have already commodified the data collected by ALPRs. Regulations should be put in place to curb how private parties can use ALPRs and the data they collect. Data retention policies must be implemented on a nation-wide level, requiring deletion within days or weeks. This data should not be permitted to be sold or monetized.
Personal choices are likely not exacerbating the issues. Unlike deleting certain apps on smart phones, or attempting to disable location services, people cannot drive a car without a license plate or avoid all roads where ALPRs are placed. However, where personal choices may not be increasing problems, individual complacency and lack of knowledge are certainly allowing ALPRs to operate unrestricted. Most think that cameras on top of streetlights or traffic lights only take pictures of those speeding or running red lights. Private efforts to share information on the capabilities of these cameras can shape how people think about surveillance as a concept.
Without increased knowledge from individuals, any efforts to pass legislation that curbs the use of ALPRs in favor of individual liberties will no doubt fail. The money backing the surveillance systems is too great of an incentive for government parties. In an ideal world, government parties would value the individual’s right to privacy, but without knowledge, subsequent outrage, and presence at voting booths, we are doomed to be tracked. | | | | |
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Why would collecting information that we are required to publish and carry around in legible form be subject to constitutional limits? Regulatory limits can be placed on information collected by state-financed resources. Presumably federal highway funds and other forms of federal assistance could be conditioned on particular privacy regimes for the information collected by government. But how could private efforts to learn what we are required to publish be controlled without infringing our rights to learn, to think, and to teach?
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