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One of the reasons for this case’s significance is the influence of Chief Justice Holt’s dissenting opinion, which advances a notion of public employment and a broader vision of employer liability than envisioned by the other justices. In Lane, Holt argues that the postmaster’s situation should be analogous to that of the innkeeper and carrier (1 Ld. Raym. 646, 652—53), and he draws analogies to the responsibilities of the sheriff and gaoler for prisoners and impounded goods (651).
Notion of Public Employment
The dissent in Lane v. Cotton is seen as expanding liability by advancing the notion that people who hold themselves open to the public take on a duty to serve. Joseph Singer bases this view in part on Justice Holt’s assertion that, “where-ever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the subject in all the things that are within the reach and comprehension of such an office, under the pain of an action against him.” Joseph Singer. No Right To Exclude. 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283 at 1306, citing 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1701) at 1464 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
Singer claims that Holt advances this notion of public duty only in very broad strokes: “Holt does not explain what a ‘public employment’ is except to say that it involves taking on a ‘public trust’ for the benefit of one's fellow subjects or ‘a trade which is for the public good.’ The notion of public employment is refined in a subsequent case, Gisbourn v. Hurst, which takes up where Holt left off. In Gisbourn, holding oneself open to the public (by engaging in a common calling) immediately meant that one was engaged in public employment. Singer at 1306—07 citing 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710).
Employer Liability
Justice Holt’s dissent in Lane v. Cotton is also significant because of its treatment of employer liability. One may view his opinion as an expansive attempt to hold employers responsible for the acts of their employees.
In the court opinion, Justice Gould denied any notion of employer liability for the acts of a negligent employee, seeing the defendants as “a community of officers acting in several trusts; and every one shall answer for himself, not one for the act of another” (648). Holt describes Justice Powis as being of the same opinion: “My brother Powis says, they are all fellow-servants; that is, the post-master and letter-carrier, because they all receive their salaries from the King.” 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 at 1467. The court thus finds that the servant may be held responsible for the loss, but the head of the department in question may not.
Holt, disagreeing with this result, attempts to justify his position upon the relevant statute, arguing that the post office position (as created by statute) is similar enough to that of a sheriff that it must be presumed the postmaster would have similar liability. He states “it must be presumed the Act designed the new officer should be liable; for why else should they make it so like in reason [to other offices such as that of the sheriff]” (1468). He also looks to the design of the statue, pointing out that one clause holds the postmaster responsible (and subject to forfeiting five pounds) for any failure to get horses, even though that is a task the statute also assigns to his deputies (1468).
Although Holt finds basis for his opinion in the statutory language, it seems that he is more influenced on public policy grounds. He views employers as in a position of power and responsibility over their employees: “here the defendant hath the power in him to manage the office by himself, his deputy or servant; and every deputy or servant is by him that puts him in, and therefore he ought to answer for him (1467). When he compares the office of postmaster to other callings, he offers a public policy rationale: “the same reason holds to charge them in this case as to charge carriers, inn-keepers, and such like, videlicet, the great inconvenience which would otherwise ensue, by reason of the dangerous temptation and opportunity they would lie under to imbezil goods intrusted to them, without possibility of proving a particular neglect” (1469).
Sir William Holdsworth argues that Holt’s dissent in the case should be viewed in the context of a larger movement to establish employer liability, which he credits to Holt’s opinions in that time period. In earlier cases, Holt espoused a broader vision of employer liability than his fellow justices. For example, in Boson v. Sandford (1691), he stated the principle that “whoever employs another is answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him,” and in Turberville v. Stamp (1689) he found liability because “if my servant doth anything prejudicial to another, it shall bind me, when it may be presumed that he acts by my authority, being about my business.” William Holdsworth. A History of English Law, Vol. 8 at 474, citing Boson v. Sandford, 2 Salk. 440 and Turberville v. Stamp , 1 Ld. Raym 264. In both cases, the court found for the plantiff on narrower grounds.
More on Liability and Agency
The case is also credited with confusing subsequent efforts to create and sort out distinctions between misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance in principles of liability. 20 A.L.R. 97 at pg. 24—25 of attachment. Holt’s opinion in the case is also considered the basis for Judge Story’s formulation of liability: “The agent is also personally liable to third persons for his own misfeasances and positive wrongs. But he is not, in general (for there are exceptions), liable to third persons for his own nonfeasances or omissions of duty, in the course of his employment. His liability, in these latter cases, is solely to his principal, there being no privity between him and such third persons, but the privity exists only between him and his principal. And hence the general maxim as to all such negligences and omissions of duty is, in cases of private agency, ‘respondeat superior.’” 20 A.L.R. 97 citing Story, Law of Agency § 308.
-- TeoTokunow - 06 Dec 2008 |