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| | | -- By JorgeRosario - 21 Apr 2024 | |
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< | Over the last few decades, the United States’ approach to war has been evolving. Unmanned aerial drones have become the new wave in violent conflict and counter-terrorism. They have slowly become the weapon of choice among federal organizations; this being especially true for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Under the Obama administration, the CIA’s paramilitary role was limited through regulations, as other countries began developing their own drone programs in reaction to the United States’ monopoly of the unmanned alternative. However, President Trump wrongfully overturned this decision, removing the regulations and giving the CIA fundamentally ‘free reign’ over these unfeeling, unwavering killing machines. This revitalized autonomy shed light on the dichotomy of the issue: humanitarians safeguarding human life versus Warhawks upholding their use in combat. | >
> | Over the last few decades, the United States’ approach to war has been evolving. Unmanned aerial drones have become the new wave in violent conflict and counter-terrorism. They have slowly become the weapon of choice among federal organizations; this being especially true for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Under the Obama administration, the CIA’s paramilitary role was limited through regulations, as other countries began developing their own drone programs in reaction to the United States’ monopoly of the unmanned alternative. However, President Trump wrongfully overturned this decision, removing the regulations and giving the CIA fundamentally ‘free reign’ over these unfeeling, unwavering killing machines. While many departments conduct drone strikes, the Agency has pioneered the use of signature strikes, raising into question the ethicality of these combat strategies and new military humanism rationales that crumble upon closer inspection. It is pivotal to move past the scope of drone essentialism and look beyond the technology itself and towards the targeting protocols that are employed. | | | | |
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< | While the CIA’s drone program has remained largely absolved from harsh regulations since its inception, there should be constraints in place. The use of signature strikes places the lives of non-combatants at a great risk. These types of strikes are almost solely controlled by artificial intelligence and encrypted data, with a human overseer performing only minimal maneuvers. Drones who perform signature strikes will detect patterns of ‘suspicious behavior’ and, from 400 ft in the air, identify what it thinks are terrorist hideouts. However, the drones’ coding has shown to regularly fail and misidentify civilians as targets, prompting the human overseer (who does not have full knowledge on what is making the drone indicate a target) to engage. The fragmentation-type explosion not only kills the supposed ‘terrorist’ but also his wife and children, the latter end being considered collateral damage within the CIA reports. This is precisely what happened to a 70-year-old Yemenise farmer who was misidentified and targeted while loading fertilizer into the back of his truck. | >
> | After the passage of the AUMF, the U.S drone program has remained largely absolved from harsh regulations. Signature strikes detect patterns of suspicious behavior and engage swiftly to neutralize the identified targets. These types of strikes are almost solely controlled by artificial intelligence and encrypted data, with a human overseer performing only minimal maneuvers. These types of strikes have been legitimized through New military humanism, “a discourse that validates drones as minimizing civilian casualties and a concern to spare the lives of the innocent.” While the U.S drone program, especially the CIA’s signature strikes, are argued to be a more lawful and consistent with humanitarian values method of engaging in warfare, a deeper dive into this military humanism reveals its flaws. | | | | |
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< | These fatal mishaps are what prompted the Obama administration to publicly impose the Jus ad bellum principle of “imminent threat” to their drone program, which required drone pilots to believe their targets would produce immediate harm if not neutralized. While these provisions would, in theory, limit the number of non-combatant casualties, it was discovered that Obama signed secret waivers allowing the CIA to continue their signature strikes in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Michael Boyle correctly depicts the reality that “drone strikes corrode the stability and legitimacy of local governments, deepen anti-American sentiment and create new recruits for Islamist networks aiming to overthrow these governments”. As individuals see their neighbors suffer at the hands of the U.S drone program, they become more inclined to support radicalized groups that claim to protect Arabian people from the encroaching West. While limiting the number of civilian casualties and avoiding the emergence of other radicalized groups are reasons for why the CIA should be constrained, the other side of the spectrum sees the CIA as a fully rational and autonomous organization that should be able to make life or death decisions on its own. | >
> | The drones’ coding has shown to regularly fail and misidentify civilians as targets, prompting the human overseer (who does not have full knowledge on what is making the drone indicate a target) to engage in narrative infilling, where the context surrounding a grainy video is unthinkingly filled in. This makes behavioral signatures ambiguous: are the group of men approaching American soldiers holding bombs or simply baskets? These are decisions that need to be made in a split decision. Furthermore, the fragmentation-type explosion not only kills the supposed ‘terrorist’ but also his wife and children, the latter end being considered collateral damage within the CIA reports. This ethical slippage in the usage of drones has allowed their transformation into weapons of terror capable of indiscriminate killing, instead of the pillar of precise and intentional counterterrorism efforts. This is precisely what happened to a 70-year-old Yemenise farmer who was misidentified and targeted while loading fertilizer into the back of his truck. | | | | |
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< | Senate Republicans argue that a reason why the CIA drone program should be left to the complete discretion of the Agency is a simple matter of national security. The drone program has remained largely a secret since its very inception. The CIA has developed strategies for these weapons of war that are in a constant state of modification to be faster, deadlier, and more autonomous. With these developments in place, the CIA states that it fears “enemies of the Nation [being] informed of our developments, and prepared to mitigate their effectiveness.” Transferring autonomy to the Department of Defense, would place the drone program under is strict regulation and public scrutiny. Simply, the advances in drone usage, that have aided tremendously in maintaining national security both mainland and abroad, are only possible because they have been done in secret and not under the glaring eye of the federal government.
Regulating the CIA drone program would not only hinder their ability to act when they see a threat, but tremendously diminish their psychological effect on terrorist organizations. Daniel Byman explains that “the reason drones cause fear in terrorists is because they can loiter above a targeted area for hours waiting for the right time to strike,” which ultimately is made possible by the autonomous software the federal government is seeking to regulate. The programming of signature strikes have turned “command and training structures into a liability,” the buzz of the drone seems to get closer and closer in the mind of the terrorist. | >
> | These fatal mishaps are what prompted the Obama administration to publicly impose the Jus ad bellum principle of “imminent threat” to their drone program, which required drone pilots to believe their targets would produce immediate harm if not neutralized. While these provisions would, in theory, fix the aforementioned ethical concerns associated with drone strikes by limiting the number of non-combatant casualties, it was discovered that Obama signed secret waivers allowing the CIA to continue their signature strikes in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Michael Boyle correctly depicts the reality that “drone strikes corrode the stability and legitimacy of local governments, deepen anti-American sentiment and create new recruits for Islamist networks aiming to overthrow these governments”. As individuals see their neighbors suffer at the hands of the U.S drone program, they become more inclined to support radicalized groups that claim to protect Arabian people from the encroaching West. | | | | |
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< | For example, when the CIA identified an al-Qaeda base in Yemen, they immediately targeted and killed the militants, among them Nasir al-Wuhayshi, an alleged leader of the extremist group. Under the imposed regulations, the CIA would have to survey the entire area for civilians, get approval from the Department of Defense, and only then could the drones act. The unproductive nature of this approach would make drones ineffective in a cost-benefit analysis, even though they are one the most refined weapons of war to date, leading to a regression towards older methods of neutralization such as foot soldiers. While regulations are originally meant to safeguard due process and protect lives, they impede the ability of the CIA to protect against radicalized groups and ultimately put more lives at risk, as American soldiers would pay the price of the effects brought on by these constraints. | >
> | In addition to the aforementioned ethical corrosion that signature strikes and the decision to use vague remote targeting on individuals present in the U.S drone program, there are international human rights Laws concerns that cement the idea that these methods of targeting cannot continue to be used in warfare. Other than the indiscriminate taking of non-combatant lives and the incentive it provides terrorist organizations to grow, many signature strikes violate international humanitarian law (IHL). The IHL underscores its view on drone strikes from the principle of distinction, protecting civilians from being the object of attack in armed conflict. While some strikes comply with this principle by attacking individuals engaged in clearly nefarious activities (handling explosives, transporting weapons), many fail to meet this standard as a matter of law or “require evidence from the target the U.S is unlikely to have prior to conducting the strike.” This method of targeting is further condemned by the IHL’s insistence that individuals cannot be arbitrarily deprived of their right to life, which signature strikes are designed to do. Even with clear violations of IHL, the drone targeting program’s path to reform is unclear. | | | | |
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< | The use of unmanned aerial vehicles and drones does not seem to be slowing down anytime soon. The proliferation of these technologically advanced weapons of war has sparked a crossroads into how the CIA should either be regulated by the federal government or be left to use its own discretion when utilizing drones. This debate raises fundamental questions about the balance between security, accountability, and ethical considerations. The regulation of CIA drone operations should prioritize both national security imperatives and respect for human rights, aiming to minimize harm to civilians while effectively countering threats to global stability. Regulations and constraints may be enacted and reversed by congressional action, however, this same principle of reactive correction does not apply to human life. | >
> | The lack of immense and proportionality in signature strikes presents a clear violation of international law, but raises a dense smokescreen on how the future of warfare should be conducted. The targeting software was created as a state of the art technology, paving the way for advanced warfare and mitigation of non-combatant lives. However, the software's imperfections and the reliance on patterns of behavior rather than confirmed identities have resulted in significant civilian casualties, undermining the very principles of precision and discrimination in warfare. A pathway to the future would likely include more stringent guidelines or heavier oversight from human operators, but it is unlikely to make a massive difference unless perspectives on drone warfare shift. A move from drone essentialism and new military humanitarianism into a holistic and progressive view that encompasses the targeting scheme rather than just the facade of technological innovation would likely shift the way drones are viewed and possibly limit their use. | | | | |
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Improvement means linking the sources, for one thing. The reader has to be able to check your sourcing, and in most cases you will have only one sourcer to offer, so the reader's own estimation of that source's accuracy and completeness is crucial.
The CIA is the federal government. It is regulated by the President, to whom it directly answers. These are hardly the only drones capable of lethal action that are being flown. All branches of US military, including special operators, operate UAVs. What is the particular point in writing about the Agency's activities? Not the drones, presumably, but the decision to use remote targeted-killing equipment against people rather loosely deemed to be combatants. The essay summarizes, but it does not make clear what, beyond the factual background, it wants the reader to learn.
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You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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